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Abstract
This paper extends the methodology first proposed by Ahmad and Stern for the design of tax
reforms that are optimal at the margin. The extension centers on a sharper approximation of
welfare measures. The original approach and its variant are illustrated in the case of the
current Mexican tax system.
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Many theoretical papers have been written on the theory of optimal taxation for the last three 
decades. However, somewhat paradoxically, most of the results in that area are of little relevance 
for economic policy-makers. This is so because the theory of optimal taxation imposes a large set 
of informational requirements that are unlikely to be met in practice: For all the representative 
agents and firms in the economy, one needs to have reliable estimates of their behavioral responses 
to all possible changes in taxes and transfers. 
Given that constraint, some authors have proposed instead simpler approaches that might 
serve as guides in the design of optimal tax systems. One of them, known as the marginal tax 
reform methodology, was first advanced by Ahmad and Stern (1984) [AS, from now on]. Their 
approach, to be reviewed below, assesses the impact of tax reforms by means of first-order 
approximations of the relevant variables, in such a way that policy-makers need information only 
about actual data (not fitted values), and aggregate rather than individual demand responses. 
The attractiveness of such a simplification is attested by a number of empirical papers that 
have applied that methodology over the years. There is, however, a drawback: As it has been 
forcefully argued in a general context by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996), the measurement 
of social welfare through the use of first-order approximations may lead to systematic biases, 
since substitution effects can be non-trivial. 
Taking note of that admonition, this paper extends the AS marginal tax analysis by means 
of sharper approximations of welfare measures, in order to have a more robust approach. Toward 
that end, the next section reviews the key issues involved in the AS methodology, while the third 
section presents the extension. Finally, the fourth section illustrates the original approach and its 
variant using as an example the current Mexican tax system. 
 
  2. The Ahmad-Stern approach 
 
According to AS, the optimality of an indirect tax structure may be evaluated by comparing, for 
all the relevant goods, the marginal social welfare cost of raising revenue via an increase in the 
excise tax on each of them. Clearly, optimality requires that such a marginal cost should be equal 
for all goods, otherwise a Pareto improvement could be implemented by lowering the tax on the 
good with the higher marginal cost, and by raising the tax on the good with the lower marginal 
cost. 
To clarify matters, consider the following simple model entertained by AS: On the 
production side prices are fixed, and all firms exhibit constant returns to scale, so that indirect tax 
changes are only reflected as consumer price changes. Given the I goods, indexed by i = 1, 2,..., I, 
let p denote the corresponding (fixed) producer price vector. Thus, if t is the vector of specific 
taxes, then q = p + t is the final consumer price vector. There are, furthermore, H households, 
indexed by h = 1, 2,..., H. For each household h, the consumption bundle that maximizes utility 
u
h(x
h) subject to the corresponding linear budget constraint is denoted as x
h(q,m
h), while the 
associated indirect utility function is expressed as v
h(q,m
h). 
We also assume the existence of a social welfare function  ) ,..., (
H 1 u u W , which can be 
rewritten in terms of prices and incomes as: 
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Now suppose that the excise tax on good i is to be increased at the margin. Given equations (1) 
and (2), the marginal social cost of that tax increase may be defined as the corresponding 
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where the negative sign on the right-hand side of (3) is needed to make positive the marginal 
social cost. This is so because ∂V/∂ti will always be negative, and, furthermore, we would expect 
∂R/∂ti to be positive in general. 



















where the first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the private marginal utility of 
income. Let us now consider its social counterpart: the social marginal utility of income of 
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We shall have to say more about these functions soon, but at this point we may note that each 
h β  
may be thought as a welfare weight, since, using the last two equations, the numerator in (3) can 
be written as the negative of the sum across households of the consumption of good i, each level 
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In a similar fashion, taking the partial derivative with respect to ti in (2), the impact on 
government revenue of a marginal increase in the excise tax is found to be 
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where εki is the uncompensated cross-price elasticity of the aggregate demand for good k with 
respect to price i. 
Finally, after defining τk = tk /qk (the proportion of the tax relative to the price), we can 
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An extensive discussion of the meaning of this expression is given in Ahmad and Stern (1984, p. 
265). For our purposes, it suffices to note that in order to apply the AS methodology, which 
requires computing and comparing each marginal social cost across the I goods, we would just 
need the following data: the final consumer prices, the welfare weights for all households, the 
consumption levels, and the aggregate cross-price elasticities. 
Thus, it would not seem to be necessary to estimate a full demand system. However, this 
last appreciation would be correct only if the welfare weights defined in (4) were independent of 
prices. Ahmad and Stern were, of course, fully aware of that fact and so they assumed in their 
model, as is commonly done in most of the applied papers on the subject, that the indirect social 
welfare function could be locally approximated by a function independent of prices. More 
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where e is a nonnegative parameter that reflects the degree of aversion to social inequality, k is a 
constant of normalization, and where the arguments of the function may be taken to be, say, total 
expenditure per household. 
  Using (4) and (8), each social marginal utility of income 
h β  may be calculated by taking 
the derivative of the social indirect utility function with respect to m
h. Furthermore, those authors 
suggested, the constant k may be chosen in such a way that the welfare weight for the poorest 
household is equal to one (and hence marginal social costs are always relative to the poorest 
household). That is to say, assuming that households are ordered according to their ascending 
incomes total expenditures, the welfare weight for household h would be given by 
e h h m m ) / (
1 = β . Thus, for instance, when e = 0, the social marginal utility of income is equal to 
one for all households and there is no aversion to social inequality; while if, say, e = 1, then a 
household with an income twice as large as the poorest would have a social marginal utility half as 
large. That is, as the parameter of inequality aversion is increased, the relative weight of the poorest 
household is increased as well. 
  It is important to note, however, that the assumption of independence of prices that lies 
behind (8) is quite restrictive. Indeed, as shown by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996, Theorem 
1), the welfare weights defined in (4) are independent of prices if and only if the indirect social 
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for some functions a
h and constants κ
h. To see how restrictive this last condition is, extend (8) to 
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According to the theorem, the only members in the class that would have welfare weights 
independent of prices would be the ones for which each indirect utility function is 
multiplicatively separable in prices and income, and for which the parameter of inequality 
aversion is equal to one. Thus, in the particular case of (8) the local approximation argument is 
formally correct only when e is near to one. 
Summing up, it is clear from the presentation above that the AS approach is neatly tied 
and very easy to apply (see Section 4 below), but it is also evident that a fragile aspect of that 
methodology is its local character. This drawback was already recognized by the own authors: 
“We do not argue that our methods are robust with respect to parameter estimates and model 
specification, and one should not expect them to be so” (Ahmad and Stern, 1984, p. 295).  
 
  3. An algebraic extension 
 
Given that all tax reforms are far from being marginal, it would be interesting to extend the AS 
methodology using at least second-order approximations as recommended by Banks, Blundell 
and Lewbel (1996). In our context, such an extension requires that, both, the numerator and the 
denominator in (3) be replaced by sharper approximations. 
More formally, we would like to compute for each good the approximate impact on 
welfare that would have a tax increase that is small, but not marginal. That is, in principle, we 
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and where, as usual, by q-i is meant the vector that includes all the elements of q except for the i-th 
component.  
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where, for each household h, the first elasticity inside the parentheses refers to the price elasticity of 
the welfare weight, as defined in (4), while the second one refers to the own-price elasticity of 























































ε ) 1 (
2
1                (13) 
 
  Finally, after simplifying (12) and (13), the following variant to the Ahmad-Stern 
approach is suggested: To analyze the approximate impact on social welfare that would have a 
tax increase that is small, but not necessarily marginal, instead of the first-order approximation 
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Since the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (14) contains both each welfare weight 
and its price elasticity, the measure suggested in this paper requires, of course, the estimation of 
the full demand system [and the use of (4)]. But the extra effort seems worthwhile: Equation (14) 
not only recognizes the fact that welfare weights do depend on prices, but also that tax changes 
involve more than marginal variations, and that a tax reform typically includes a differential 
treatment across goods. 
 
4. An application to Mexico 
 
Regarding the Mexican tax system, Urzúa (1994 and 2001) and Campos (2002) provided the first 
studies that estimated the welfare consequences of several tax reforms. Their work, however, did 
not follow the AS methodology, since they estimated full demand systems to make global 
welfare comparisons. Nevertheless, for the purpose of our example we can use here the demand 
system recently estimated by Campos (2002), which is based on an official income and 
expenditure survey taken in the year 2000 (INEGI, 2001). 
  That author aggregated the consumption goods into five categories, using as the 
composition criterion the differential treatment accorded by Mexican tax laws to the value added 
tax (VAT): A 0% VAT rate for the case of non-processed food, medicines and education (which is 
actually exempted), and a 15% VAT rate for processed food, clothing, appliances, and alcoholic 
beverages (including tobacco).
1 A brief description of those five composite goods is given in the 
                                                 
1 Note that in our model tk is a quantity tax, not an ad-valorem tax. Thus, given a 15% VAT rate, the corresponding τk 
(the proportion of the tax relative to the consumer price) is 0.15/1.15 ≈ 13%.   6
first column of Table 1 below, while the other five columns present the corresponding 
uncompensated cross-price elasticities. 
 
Table 1 
Composite Goods and Uncompensated Cross-Price Elasticities 
 
    1 2 3 4  5 
1. Non-processed food and dairy products  -0.636  0.033  0.013  0.260  0.152 
2. Processed food, clothing and appliances  -0.026  -0.672  0.012  -0.027  -0.041
3. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco    -0.062  0.038 -0.816 0.295 2.140 
4. Medicines    -0.255  -0.608 0.022 -1.032  -0.185
5. Education    -0.106  -0.289 -0.031 -0.218  -0.955
Source: Campos (2002, tables 3 and 5). 
 
  Using Table 1, we are now ready to illustrate the AS approach and the variant suggested in 
this paper. First note that in order to allow for a direct comparison between both approaches we 
have to make use of Atkinson’s function, given in equation (8) above, since the AS approach 
assumes that the indirect social welfare function is independent of prices. Thus, at the risk of losing 
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Aside from the fact that (15) is more realistic than (7), insofar as it allows for non-marginal tax 
changes, both equations are similar in terms of their informational requirements. The only 
difference is that (15) requires estimates of the own-price elasticities of household demands. In 
our case, given that the demand system was estimated using a single cross-section of 10,108 
different households, we estimate those demand responses by the average of the corresponding 
elasticities in each income decile. 
  Making now use of Table 1, as well as of raw data on prices, consumption levels and 
aggregate demand responses, all of them classified by deciles, Table 2 presents for each good an 
estimate of the marginal social welfare cost λi, as given in (7). Those results are shown for four 
different levels of inequality aversion: From e=0, when there is no aversion whatsoever, to e=3, 
when the welfare of the poorest has a substantial relative weight in the social welfare function. 
Table 2 also presents the results obtained when we use second-order approximations to compute 
the variant Λi, using the simplification given in (15), and after assuming a uniform increase of $2 in 
the quantity taxes for all goods. This last magnitude was chosen since it represented an increase 
from 0% to about 10% in the case of the average price of non-processed food and dairy products. 
Note that such a price change was taken to be the same across goods to make a fair comparison 
with the results obtained using (7), but, of course, one of the advantages of (15) over (7) is that now 
the goods could be accorded a differential tax treatment. 
   7
Table 2 
Marginal and Approximate Social Welfare Costs 
 
   Degree of inequality aversión 
   e=0  e=1  e=2  e=3 
Non-processed food and dairy products   λ1      1.018  0.125 0.051 0.040 
Λ1      1.062  0.129 0.053 0.041 
Processed food, clothing and appliances  λ2      1.096  0.055 0.008 0.004 
Λ2      1.088  0.054 0.008 0.004 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco             λ3      0.869  0.098 0.044 0.036 
Λ3      0.851  0.096 0.043 0.035 
Medicines                                                  λ4      1.022  0.059 0.011 0.006 
Λ4      0.988  0.057 0.010 0.006 
Education                                                  λ5      1.021  0.035 0.004 0.001 
Λ5      0.992  0.034 0.003 0.001 
 
  Now suppose that the Mexican government decides to increase tax revenue at the lowest 
social welfare cost.
2 According to Table 2, when there is no inequality aversion, both methods 
suggest that the excise tax to be raised is the one on alcoholic beverages and tobacco. However, 
once e is increased, the preferred choice becomes education for both approaches. Therefore, as 
the concern about the poorest takes more importance, one has to shift from “sin taxes” to taxes on 
education. This last result should be interpreted with extreme care, however, since in this type of 
models education is wrongly put on the same footing as mere consumption, while in fact the 
social return on education is certainly larger than its private return. 
  It should also be noted that even though both variants suggest, in this example, the same 
optimal way to raise revenue, the ranking of social costs is not always the same for both methods. 
For instance, when there is no inequality aversion, the A-S approach would suggest that imposing a 
tax on education would have a lower social welfare cost than taxing medicines, while our method 
suggests precisely the contrary. Finally, it almost goes without saying that the main reason for the 
numerical similarity between the two approaches is the use of the rough approximation given in 




This paper has presented an extension to the marginal tax analysis put forward by Ahmad and 
Stern two decades ago. The variant recognizes that welfare weights do depend on prices, that tax 
changes are usually more than marginal, and that tax reforms typically include a differential 
treatment across goods. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Actually, since the end of 2000, the government has made several attempts to impose non-zero tax rates on non-
processed food, medicines and/or education, without any success. One of the reasons for that failure could be that 
Congress has found the social welfare consequences of the tax reform to be lacking.   8
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